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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH A. SWIECICKI,

••
••

Plaintiff-Appellant,

••
•
••

.

vs.

Case No. 18315

••

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, and UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

••
••
••
••
••
••

Defendants-Respondents.

••
••
••

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action, plaintiff seeks unemployment compensation benefits under the Utah Employment Security Act, § 35-4-1
et seg., Utah Code Ann.
DISPOSITION IN
On

August

6,

(1953, as amended).

ADMINI~TRATIVE

1981,

2

1

REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

plaintiff

was

prevented

by

his

employer from reporting to work and was advised his termination
was in progress.

Plaintiff was officially terminated from his
.J'

job as an air traffic controller at the Salt Lake International

!Hereinafter, reference to the Utah Code Annotated will
be by "U.C.A.", followed by designation of the appropriate section thereof.
2All dates herein are in 1981 unless otherwise indicated.

-1-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Airport effective September 15.

On August

plied for

benefits.

unemployment

insurance

27,

On September 18,

plaintiff's application was denied under u .C.A.
and

(d).

plaintiff ap-

On October 13, plaintiff appealed.

§

35-4-5 (b) (1)

On December 30,

Appeal Referee Stanley H. Griffin affirmed the denial of plaintiff's application for
(d).
§

benefits

under

U.C.A.

§

35-4-S(a)

and

The appeal referee did not rely in any part upon U.C.A.

35-4-S(b) (1)

in so ruling.

On

January

8,

1982,

plaintiff

appealed Referee Griffin's decision to the Board of Review of
the

Industrial

Security

Commission of

(hereinafter the

Utah,

Department

"Board of Review") •

of

Employment

In a decision

dated February 16, 1982, the Board of Review (member Richard H.
Schone

separately

decision.

concurring)

Pursuant to U.C.A.

affirmed
§

the

Appeal

35-4-lO(i), plaintiff filed his

Petition for Writ of Review herein on March 15, 1982.
24, 1982 plaintiff filed his opening brief.
defendants filed

t~eir

brief~

Referee's

On June

On August 20, 1982

Plaintiff now replies to defen-

dants' arguments.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board
of

Review

plaintiff.

affirming

the

denial

o~

unemployment

benefits

to

Plaintiff asks the Court to direct the Department

of Employment Security to grant him unemployment benefits and
award him costs and attorneys' fees incurred in his appeals.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff does not wish to supplement the Statement of
Facts contained

in his

opening

brief.

Facts

support of plaintiff's reply to defendants'

relied

upon

in

arguments will be

set forth in the Argument portion of this brief below.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION
WAS ARBITRARY
ANY EVIDENCE
REASONABLE AS

OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
AND CAPRICIOUS, UNSUPPORTED BY
OR ADEQUATE FINDINGS AND UNA MATTER OF LAW.

Plaintiff does not contest the general statements
defendants'
Industrial
here,

the

brief concerning standard of review applicable
Commission
underlying

decisions
facts

on

are

issues

basically

of

fact.

undisputed,

in
to

However
leaving

only legal issues of statutory interpretation and application,
which
§

are

fully

Court
under
U.C.A •
..
In any event, if ever there was a case where a

35-4-10 (i).

reviewable

by

this

decision was arbitrary, capricious, totally unsupported by the
Def en-

record and procedurally irregular, this is that case.
dants

virtually

concede

as

much

Q}1
....

the

admissions

in

their

brief.
In the statement of facts at pages 3-5 of their brief,
defendants admit that "[p]laintiff informed Mr. Lee that he was
prepared to come to work" on August 6; that later in the day
plaintiff told Lee " • • • he would report for duty • • • "; that
plaintiff

n.

•

• did report later in the evening around 11:30

p.m • • • • "; that "[u]pon presenting himself to the supervisor,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff was told that an intent to terminate was in progress
and he should leave the facility immediately •

•

•

n

(emphasis

added); that "[o]n August 9, 1981, a letter was sent to Plaintiff informing him of an intent to remove him from his position
as air

traffic controller

• • • ";

and finally that

"[c] onse-

quently, Plaintiff was informed by a letter dated September 8,
1981 that he was officially terminated effective September 15,
1981." (emphasis added).

Further, at page 7 of their argument,

after stating that the issue is whether the facts show a discharge or a

n

"voluntary quit", defendants state,

undisputed that

the claimant was discharged

•

• •

•

•

n

•

it

is

(emphasis

added)!
Although there appear to be no Utah cases discussing
the

distinction

U.C.A.

35-4-5

§

reason.

between

a

voluntary

itself draws

quit

and

that distinction,

If the employee tells his employer

a

discharge,

and

for

"I quit",

good
under

subsectior' (a) the l'"1rden is on the employee to establish "good
cause" or else the employee can be penalized by loss of unemployment benefits.

But if on the other hand, as here, the em-

ployer says, "You're fired", the burden is on him to establish
much more than good cause for thai~decision.
(b)

(1),

the

employer

must

establish

Under subsection

"deliberate,

willful

wanton" conduct before the employee may be penalized.

or

Thus,

the issue here is whose act terminated plaintiff's employment.
The only evidence is that it was the employer's act.
point

did

plaintiff

ever

evidence

an

intent

employment.
-4-
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to

At .!!.£

quit

his

Moreover,
plaintiff

there

intended,

actions would

or

result

is

no

evidence

knew or had

in

the

reason to

in termination.

As

record

know

conceded

that

that
his

by defen-

dants, plaintiff knew he had an "amnesty" until at least 8:00
a.m. on August 6.

After speaking with Lee, he knew he had un-

til at least 9:00 a.m. to report to work and reason to believe
that Lee could grant further

extensions of

plaintiff knew he was no longer employed,

the amnesty.

If

if he intended to

quit his job, there would have been no reason for him to report
for work at 11:30 p.m.

Then, when he did report, fully expect-

ing and desiring to resume his duties, he was ordered off the
job!

Whether his employer had good cause for this discharge of

plaintiff is a different issue, to be decided in a different
forum.

However, there is no question that this was an involun-

tary discharge and not a voluntary quit.

The statement in the

Board of Review's main opinion that "the claimant's indecision
was in effect a decision" (R.0016) punishes co· duct clearly not
intended to be punished by
In

Continental

§

Oil

35-4-S(a).
Co.

v.

Board

of

Review

of

the

Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, 568 P.2d 727 (Utah
~

1977) this Court stated that the overall purpose of the Employment Security Act is " • • • to cushion the effect of unemployrnent

•

•

•

Id. at p.

"

730.

Therefore the Court adopted the

position that those portions of the Act removing eligibility
for

benefits

should

be

strictly

construed

as

penalties

forfeitures:

-5-
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or

--

[A] n ambiguous or doubtful term should be
given a construction which is least likely
to work a forfeiture.
The penal character
of the provision should be minimized by excluding, rather than including, conduct not
clearly intended to be within the provision. Id. (emphasis added).
What the defendants have attempted to do is obvious.
They

knew there was

plaintiff

for

no factual

"willful,

basis

wanton or

upon which

deliberate"

to penalize

conduct.

They

also knew that they could assess the same penalty by calling
the discharge something it was not.

Although defendants have

cited no specific court decision that would apply to the facts
of this case,
sions

from

their brief obliquely refers to anonymous deci-

other

jurisdictions,

could justify their actions.

implying

that

such

decisions ·

However, any such decisions would

themselves be unreasonable, wrongly decided and cannot be followed by this Court in light of Continental Oil.
legal legerdemain can turn an apple

No amount of

into an orange simply by

calling it one.
The Court may wonder,

as plaintiff has wondered, why

he should receive such treatment from defendants.

The reason

is revealed in the following concurring opinion from the Board
of Review decision:
Were this case isolated by itself, there are
circumstances which might give cause to consideration of the principle of equity and
good conscience.
However,
based on the
overall circumtances for all Air Traffic
Controllers,
I
am concurring
that
this
claimant be treated the same as his coworkers.
(R.0017, emphasis added).

-6-
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Thus, plaintiff was not given a fair

hearing on the

individual merits of his case and cannot expect to receive one
if this case is remanded, rather than decided once and for all
by

this Court.

Instead,

he

is the victim of

still

another

label, that of "air traffic controller", which established an
irrebuttable presumption or predisposition in the minds of the
defendants that he was to be penalized, regardless of his particular circumstances.

This is truly arbitrariness and capri-

ciousness at their worst.
This arbitrariness and capriciousness is also demonstrated by the fact that the findings of the Appeal Referee,
adopted by the Board of Review, are inadequate to support their
decision under U.C.A.
just a finding

§

35-4-5 (a).

The

statute

requires not

that plaintiff "left work voluntarily without

good cause"; it also requires a finding as to whether plaintiff
left work "under circumstances of such a nature that it would
b~

contrary to equity and good conscience to impose such a dis-

qualification", considering,

". • • the reasonableness of the

claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a continuing attachment to the labor market • • • • "
latter finding does not appear

any~here

The

in the record, and it

is obvious from the above-quoted concurring opinion that the
Board
ciples!

of

Review

refused

to

consider

these

statutory

prin-

If they had been genuinely considered (beyond mere lip

service).., the same decision could not have been reached.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The final indication of the unreasonableness of defendants' actions comes from the fact that, after they twice rejected the preliminary decision (R.0054) that plaintiff was in
fact discharged, Argument IV of

their

brief

retreats

to the

position -that plaintiff not only was discharged but that the
grounds for discharge were "deliberate, willful or wanton" conduct.

However,

this argument

is

definitely

too

little,

and

much, much too late.

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY NOT NOW CONTEND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DISCHARGED FOR A
"DELIBERATE, WILLFUL OR WANTON ACT" AND
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OR FINDINGS IN SUPPORT
OF SUCH A CONTENTION.
The only issue properly before this Court is whether
plaintiff quit his job.

Not only are there no findings by the

Appeal Referree or Board of Review of "deliberate, willful or
wa~ton"

conduct

on

the

part

of

plaintiff,

but

the

Appeal

Referee's rejection (R.0037) of Brant's preliminary decision on
(R. 00054)

this point must be taken as

a

finding

of no such

conduct.

...

For defendants to be asserting this contention for the
first time now, after not even raising it in their Answer to
the Petition for Writ of Review, shows the procedural nightmare
they continue to inflict on plaintiff.

Thus, if the result of

this appeal is a decision that plaintiff did not quit his job,
but that the case should be remanded for

-8-

a determination of
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whether his discharge was for willful misconduct, the Court can
be sure of what the decision will be, in light of defendants'
obvious desire
controller.

to punish plaintiff

for

being

an air

traffic

As with the issue of whether plaintiff voluntarily

quit his job, the fact that there is no evidence to support a
finding of willful misconduct will not present defendants from
making such a finding.
From the evidence and findings presently in the record, this Court should hold that, as a matter of law, plaintiff's discharge was not for willful misconduct.

In Continen-

tal Oil, the case which brought about the 1979 amendments to

u.c.A.

§

35-4-5 (b) (1)

adding the

"deliberate, willful or wan-

ton" standard, the Court was careful to draw a very clear distinction between this type of conduct and • • • mistakes, errors in judgment '. • • carelessness or negligence
at 730.
that can

As characterized by the Board of Review,
b~

• • •

Id

the worst

said about plaintiff's conduct is that it resulted

from "indecision".

Plaintiff cannot be subjected to a penalty

or forfeiture on this basis.
CONCLUSIO~

All plaintiff asks from this Court are his rights to a
reasonable

interpretation

of

statutes

designed

to

protect

rather than punish him, and a fair and impartial application of
these

st,atutes

to

facts

that

are

generally

not

in dispute.

Plaintiff has received neither in the previous administrative
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proceedings and cannot expect to receive them in the future, if
this case is remanded.

The Court should rule that, as a matter

of law, plaintiff was discharged and that the grounds for discharge do not amount to willful misconduct •
.// 1 ii

/'r

DATED this

-day of September, 1982.
PRINC~E, !.E~·~
i

I '

I

vers
Plaintiff-Appellant

At
MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this

1- If

/:1 -day

of September, 1982, I hereby certify that

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of
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foregoing

Reply

Brief,

to

the

following

parties

record:
Floyd G. Astin/K. Allan Zabel
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
of Utah
Department of Employment Security
1234 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah l4115
Mr. Robert Huffine/Mr. Robert Blunk
Personnel Off ice ARM-16
Labor Relations Branch
FAA Rocky Mountain Region
10455 East 25th Avenue
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